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Abstract
This article focuses on the different manner in which antidiscrimination
regimes treat groups that have been discriminated-against de jure and de
facto. This Article approaches the prerequisite of antidiscrimination laws
that there be some past or on-going discrimination in a manner that
diverges from the dominant view that discrimination is a purely
destructive force. The central argument is that the way in which de jure,
overt and blatant discrimination necessarily must create a coherent group
identity recognized by law allows groups that are discriminated against in
this manner to obtain remedial relief, whereas the law fails to recognize a
coherent group identity for de facto discriminated-against groups and thus
these groups have to overcome a structural challenge to obtain remedial
relief to counter the discrimination. Thus, strangely, groups that are
discriminated against de jure might be better off than groups that are
discriminated against only de facto once one considers both the
discriminatory and the remedial phases. After establishing the de jure/de
facto distinction, the article explores the effects of this distinction on the
equal protection claims of discriminated-against groups by contrasting the
experiences of African-Americans and Mexican-Americans.
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“State power has made a significant difference
– sometimes between life and death –
in the efforts of Black people to transform their world” 1

Introduction
Imagine discrimination as an advantageous stratagem – unimaginable? Not
necessarily. This Article suggests that formal, overt, blatant discrimination in an early,
discriminating stage could be helpful by enabling a discriminated group to establish
itself, creating group recognition, and positioning the group as eligible for
antidiscrimination relief at a later, remedial stage.
Antidiscrimination laws are one of the most significant areas where the law
recognizes and seeks to redress suffering and injustice. They allow formerly
discriminated against groups to utilize the legal system to redistribute social power
through variety of remedies. This Article approaches the prerequisite of
antidiscrimination laws that there be some past or on-going discrimination in a
manner that diverges from the dominant view that discrimination is a purely
destructive force. In contrast, this Article argues that discrimination can be a positive
force inasmuch as it provides legal recognition for a discriminated against group. In
other words, sometimes legal discrimination can make a group better off than it
otherwise would be by creating a group cohesiveness that the group can later use to
access powerful legal remedies against past wrongs.
This Article advances a novel argument re-evaluating discriminatory legal
rules as also having potentially important constructive, constitutive value for groups.
This notion does not mean that discrimination is good. Rather, the argument is that a
specific form of discrimination, namely de jure discrimination, not only negatively
influences the well-being of the group that is discriminated against, it also has indirect
positive effects on the well-being of the group later on by improving that group's
ability to access the legal system to fight against this discrimination. Additionally, the
Article suggests that in addition to influencing the well-being of the de jure
discriminated group, de jure discrimination also indirectly influences groups that

1

Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331,1382 (1988).
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mainly suffer from another form of discrimination, namely de facto discrimination.
The latter category of groups will often lack the ability to access the legal system that
the former category of groups generally has. Thus, strangely, groups that are
discriminated against de jure might be better off than groups that are discriminated
against only de facto once one considers both the discriminatory and the remedial
phases. The reason for this paradox is simple: it is easier to fight legal battles for
group remedy when a group has already been identified as the "outlawed" and is
asking to be “inlawed”. In doctrinal terms, this Article's argument is apparent in the
prerequisite of Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence that one should be
discriminated against due to one’s membership in a recognizable, distinct group.
Groups that suffer from de facto discrimination, as opposed to de jure discrimination,
face structural barriers in fulfilling this requirement.
The hypothesis in this Article is that de jure ddiscriminatoin has important
effects. De jure discrimination perpetuates the identity of the discriminated group, it
increases the sense of "realness" of the discrimination-based suffering, and it
vindicates the group's need for and entitlement to legal redress. To put in other>your
decision?> terms, although groups suffering from de jure discrimination were brutally
excluded from society by the law, they were, at the same time, included in society's
primer legal text, received "visibility" (albeit notorious visibility), and were
constituted as a legal entity (albeit as a discriminated-against group). These effects
become evident through what this Article calls the "streaming from de jure
discrimination paradigm," a phenomenon in which a group's struggle to become
recognized by law as a discriminated-against entity that is entitled to legal remedy is
reinforced when that discrimination is de jure. In other words, a group being de jure
discriminated against at an early stage, which this Article designates the
"discriminating stage," dramatically increases that group's prospects of recognition as
a "legally discriminated group" that enjoys the right to obtain antidiscrimination relief
during the later, "curing stage".2 This understanding of the interaction between de jure
discrimination and legal relief demonstrates that the past existence of de jure
discrimination is a key factor in determining the quality and quantity of the legal relief
2

The stage of commitment to the “antidiscrimination principle” begun gradually after the Civil War
and during the Reconstruction, but is much more evident, coherent, and holistic since the mid-20th
century. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976). Kimberle Crenshaw marks the abolishment of the Jim Crow legal
system as the crucial point of transition into the “formal equality” era. Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1377.
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later available to the group and is a key factor in determining how difficult it is for the
group to obtain such relief. This Article challenges the justness of the current
"streaming from de jure discrimination paradigm" and instead proposes an alternative
approach that is more sensitive to different modes of discrimination and thus more
effective at fighting both substantive and formal discrimination, whether that
discrimination is de facto or de jure.
This Article's analysis is relevant to any regime in which at the first stage
dichotomous de jure and de facto discriminatory practices exist simultaneously and in
which at the second stage antidiscrimination laws are used to remedy the past
discrimination.4 In the discrimination stage, all groups are subject to de facto
discrimination, while only some of them are also explicitly subject to de jure
discrimination. Although the theoretical application of the Article is more general, to
demonstrate its implications, the Article concentrates<needs a proposition?> two real
world examples, first the contrasting American experiences of African- and Mexican
Americans and second the Israeli experience with Mizrahi-Jews and ArabPalestinians. The divergent experiences of these groups represent the different
remedial treatment available to groups along the scale form de jure to de facto
discrimination and help illustrate the implications of this Article's approach.
African-Americans are the most prominent group to suffer from de jure
discrimination and represent the way in which "the streaming from de jure
discrimation paradigm" creates a legally cognizable discriminated-against group. This
group was the main target of America's de jure discrimination, both slavery and the
Jim Crow, state-sponsored, constitutionally protected system of racial discrimination
that took place after the abolition of slavery from 1890 through the mid-twentieth
century.5 Mexican-Americans, on the other hand, do not fit into the de jure paradigm
and demonstrate why the typical "streaming from de jure discrimination paradigm"
needs to be revised. Mexican-Americans are considered America's "forgotten
minority"; indeed, their status as a legally cognizable minority group is fragile even in
the present day.6 Mexican-Americans did not explicitly fall under any of America's de
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My argument is limited to racial discrimination since it is the hardest category to identify and
determine, as opposed to gender-based groups or the group of the disabled, for example.
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On the Jim Crow legal system of segregation see F. James Davis, Who is Black? 51-70 (1991). On
the constitutionality of slavery see Constitutional Law 422-431 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al., 4th ed., 2001).
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jure discriminatory practices during the Jim Crow era, despite the fact that MexicanAmericans were a substantial minority group at the time.7 However, although they did
not suffer from de jure discrimination, Mexican-Americans did suffer from
discriminatory practices such as chronic abuse and segregation.8 This discrimination
was quite similar to that suffered by groups suffering from de jure discrimination,9
except that the discrimination against Mexican-Americans did not primarily occur
through the use of the formal legal system. To date, despite being the largest minority
group in American today,10 Mexican-Americans remain largely invisible in the
American antidiscrimination discourse.11
The dominant position of African-Americans over Mexican Americans in the
antidiscrimination discourse has been widely discussed.12 This Article sheds new
light on this discussion and suggests that the difference between the two groups
6

Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class under Rule 23
and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 Notre Dame Lawyer 393 (1975) (arguing though that a huge
change has occured with Mexican-American identity); Reynaldo Anaya Valencia, Sonia R. Garcia,
Henry Flores & Jose Roberto Juarez Jr, Mexican Americans & the Law 16 (2004) [hereinafter:
Mexican Americans & the Law].
7
The survey was conducted in Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, the southern
states in which most Mexican-Americans resided. See Gary A. Greenfield & Don B. Kates, Mexican
Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 662, 680 (1975).
8
For a brief history of Mexican-American encounters with the law see Mexican Americans & the Law,
supra note 6, at 4-10.
9

Greenfield & Kates, supra note 7, at 687.
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U.S. Census figures identify Latinos as "the largest minority group in the U.S.” See Margaret E.
Montoya, A Brief History of Chicana/o School Segregation: One Rationale for Affirmative Action, 12
Berkeley La Raza L.J. 159, 162 (2000-01).
11

Eduardo Luna, How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Mexicans/Mexican Americans and
Discrimination Against Them Invisible, 14 La Raza L. Jour 225 (2003) (suggesting that MexicanAmericans have not suffered from discrimination or that they never resisted it).
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See generally, Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby - LatCrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1585, 1596 (1997) (determining a black
exceptionalism to other discriminated groups in America); Andrew Hacker, Two Nations: Black and
White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal (1992) 16 (considers the Fourteenth Amendment and its
antidiscrimination jurisprudence as tailored to African-Americans’ experience). For a contrary position,
see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American
Racial Thought, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1219 (1997). Courts do not necessarily uphold the paradigm. See
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(suggesting that “…the Mexican-Americans residing in this district have experienced deprivations and
discriminations similar to those suffered by the district's Negroes, and they share with the Negro the
special problems involved in overcoming existing divisive conditions and the stigma and disadvantage
that have accompanied their segregation”). Other scholarship contends that the current socioeconomic
status of Mexican Americans is even worse than that of African-Americans. See Luna, supra note 11,
at 229. The 2000 United States Census reveals that Latinos currently comprise the largest minority
group and suffer from greater segregation than African-Americans. See Montoya, supra note 10, at
162. On the shared conceptual prejudice against both groups see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
Critical Race Theory (2001) 76-74.
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represents also the different forms of discrimination suffered by them. Although one
may consider it fairly obvious that different types of discrimination lead to different
treatment in the discrimination discourse, this specific difference between the groups- where African-Americans have enjoyed full recognition as a discriminated-against
group while Mexican-Americans have not--nonetheless demands further inquiry.
Another example of this de jure/de facto distinction is found in Israel. On one
hand, Israel has a well-developed antidiscrimination jurisprudence and the right for
equality is guaranteed to all its citizens.13 On the other hand, due to Israel's Jewish
foundations, de jure discrimination against non-Jews still exists with the primary goal
of maintaining Israel’s Jewish majority.14 Within this legal framework, the
recognition of the de jure discriminated groups and the non-recognition of thede
facto ones is extremely apparent. The Mizrahis, a group of Jews of Arab descent, are a
legally unrecognized group that suffers from lingering de facto discrimination. Unlike
Mexican-Americans, Mizrahis are largely absent from the Israeli discrimination
discourse. This absence is better understood when compared to the social and legal
position of the Arab-Israelis group, which is the prototypical discriminated-against
“other” in the Israeli context. Unlike African-Americans, where America’s legal
colorblindness replaced past de jure discrimination, Israel's law with regard to ArabIsraelis simultaneously exists in both the remedying and discriminating stages. As a
result, their Arab-Israelis' status as the main target of de jure discrimination has, in a
paradoxical way, positioned them to be the main recipients of antidiscrimination relief
in areas where discrimination against them cannot be justified as defending the Jewish
character of Israel.15 This state of affairs affects the Israeli courts' judgments about the
position of Mizrahis and makes the de facto discrimination that the Mizrahis suffer
more invisible and legally unrecognizable.

13

The right of equality for all has been adopted by the Supreme Court as the heart of both Israel’s
constitutional and administrative laws. For Israel’s unique manner of protecting human rights through
the judiciary see Aron Barak, Constitutional Law without a Constitution: The Role of the Judiciary, in
The Role of Courts in Society 448 (S. Shetreet ed., 1988).
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For the delicate status of Arabs in Israel as citizens and simultaenously de jure and de facto
discriminated-against minority see generally, David Kretzmer, The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel
(1990). For the various forms of discrimination against Arab-Israelis see id, at 89-134.
15

See Chaim Gans, The Palestinian Right of Return and the Justice of Zionism, 5 Theoretical Inquiries
in Law 269 (2004); Amnon Rubinstein & Barak Medina, The Constitutional Law of Israel:
Fundamental Principles 463-466 (6th ed., 2005).

8
Methodologically, this Article focuses on litigation over segregation, primarily
in education, as the way in which these different groups engage in the discrimination
discourse. It traces the various ways in which segregation litigation has contributed to
producing the legal recognition of groups that suffered de jure segregation as opposed
to the way it has shaped (or failed to shape) the legal recognition of groups that
suffered primarily from de facto segregation. The former have come to be recognized
as strong, cohesive groups, whereas the latter have acquired at best a fragile group
recognition.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I situates the Article's analysis at the
juncture of the forms of discrimination and equal protection analyses as they relates to
other proximate analyses. Part II explores the advantages of de jure discrimination,
namely that it creates legally cognizable groups and thereby enhances the ability of
that group to obtain de jure relief. Parts III and IV describe the ways in which the
current rights discourse misses the process by which groups that suffer from de facto
discrimination seek to achieve de jure relief. The focus in these parts is on the ways in
which American and Israeli courts, dealing with segregation litigation in education,
have failed to apply antidiscrimination law paradigms to groups that have typically
suffered from de facto discrimination. Part V argues for the greater use of contextual
tools in applying antidiscrimination rules to de facto discrimination. Courts should be
more attentive to the full legal history of a group pleading discrimination and the lack
de jure discrimination against a group should not necessarily limit the legal
recognition that group should receive during the remedial stage.
Part I: Location, Location
This article’s argument is located at the intersection of the anti-discrimination and
epistemological discourses and challenges the traditional conception of the ways in
which these discourses intersect. This part discusses the different ways in which the
discourses intersect and how this Article's argument affects them.
1) The De jure – De facto Distinction discourse
What makes an act “de jure” and thus makes it eligible for judicial review? Is
a single, concrete decision by a low hierarchy official as to whether an action is de
jure under a federal statute? Over time, the distinction between de jure and de facto
has been progressively blurred, and sometimes this distinction signifies little more
than a legal conclusion. This ephemeral distinction has been criticized as having an
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elusive, false jurisprudential effect, enabling court to draw a thin, manipulable line
between de facto and de jure acts.16 Though fully aware of this criticism and
supportive of it, this Article still argues that at some level the distinction matters;
specifically, the distinction matters to the way in which groups discriminated against
in different ways perceive themselves politically and to the way in which those groups
are perceived by others. This Article employs the distinction consciously in its
extreme technical sense in order to make this theoretical point. Using the phrase de
jure discrimination, I have in mind a most materialistic, formal meaning, namely
discrimination that is effected by overt, explicit, and systematic laws and regulations.
De facto actions of discrimination, on the other hand, result from actions that are
covert and that are less or not formalized in primer legal texts. These two poles of
discrimination, nonetheless, are located along a continuum, in which the more
resemblance the type of discrimination being complained of bears to one of the poles,
the more direct the argument made in this Article applies.
Discussion of the role of the de jure/de facto distinction in the current
discrimination analysis has been somewhat meager and one-dimensional. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains only state action, and thus
only counters de jure discrimination. This truth has profoundly limited courts' power
to confront non-de jure discriminatory actions. Since they occurred with little if any
legal record, de facto discriminatory practices were more difficult to track than de jure
discriminatory practices. Particularly in the struggle for desegregation in education,
artificial and blurred lines were drawn between largely similar discriminating acts by
public authorities.17 These arbitrary lines had a devastating effect on the struggle of de
facto discriminated against groups to overcome such discrimination.18 In many cases,
courts refused to provide relief for complaints made about segregating practices on

16

For a challenge of this distinction in order to demonstrate a de jure discrimination that allows for de
jure relief see "De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools" 7 Har. Civil Rt-Civil Lib. LR 307
(1972) (challenging the denial of de jure discriminated-against status for Chicanos in Texas).
17
See, for example, the opinions of Justices Douglas and Powell in Keyes v. School District No. 1,
Denver, CO, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), in which they clarified that any discrimination administered by a
state agency, regardless of its informal basis, as in the case of a discriminatory unwritten policy and
discriminatory decisions by officals, is a state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. Referring to
the Board of Education's acts presented as "de facto discrimination," Justice Douglas declared that
"each is but another form of de jure discrimination" and suggests there should be no constitutional
implications to the distinction once the force of law is placed behind the defendants. Ibid, at p.216.
18
Id, at 218-19. Justice Powell suggested abandoning it in favor of adopting a broader conception of
constitutional justice. See Mexican Americans & the Law, supra note 6, at 27-28
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the grounds that those practices were not de jure and thus did not provide grounds for
judicial intervention.19
The traditional critique of the distinction between de jure and de facto
discrimination is different than the one this Article stresses. The traditional critique's
main goal is to facilitate a re-conceptualization of de jure acts to include acts that are
currently perceived as de facto ones with the eventual end goal of dismantling the
distinction.20 This Article, rather, stresses that the distinction, though largely
unjustified, has yet some meaningful effects that have been so far ignored in the
attempts to normatively abolish the distinction. This Article proposes a
phenomenological insight on the systematic effects that the divergent forms of
discrimination have in creating "legally cognized discriminated groups".
2) The Judicial Protection of Minorities Discourse
The de jure/de facto distinction’s critique is significant to scholarship on the
justification for having judicial review that favors discriminated-against groups.21 In
his article on the judiciary’s legitimate role in protecting minority rights, Bruce
Ackerman used an interest-group analysis to reorient the doctrine of judicial
intervention in minority rights.22 Ackerman pointed out the misconceptions embedded
in the Supreme Court's standard "discrete and insular" definition for determining
which groups are entitled to judicial protection through the Equal Protection Clause.23
He specifically argues that the Court has failed to evaluate the real need for judicial
intervention on behalf of "anonymous and defused" minorities; Ackerman argues that
these groups need protection since they are typically less politically empowered than
the "discrete and insular" minorities. The argument here follows Ackerman's and, to
some extent, criticizes it as ignoring worsened groups in need for judiciary protection,
namely, minorities which are "anonymous, defused and legally absent".
Although Ackerman's argument focuses on the separation of powers and the
judiciary's power to nullify discriminatory statutes, it also suggests a broader,

19

See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American
Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 555, 586-603 (1994) (presenting the various
petitions declined on this basis).
20
See Cisneros, supra note 12, at 617-18 (reconceptualizating the facts as de jure acts). For a
comprehensive example of such a project, see Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala (Project Report),
De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 Harv. Civil Rt-Civil Lib. L. Rev. 307 (1972).
21
Developments in the Law – Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1125 (1968-1969).
22
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985).
23
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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enduring role for the judiciary with regard to protecting minorities.24 Ackerman's
analysis presupposes a viable legal recognition of the minority group, since he targets
the anti-democratic nature of the de jure discrimination from which that group suffers.
His basic idea is that the less politically effective a discriminated against group is, the
more courts are democratically empowered to operate to protect that group. In the
case of legally absent minorities, this political weakness is especially pronounced. For
example, these minorities lack the "visibility" necessary for the political system to
recognize their suffering or to enable them to accumulate political power. This Article
argues that these features are heavily influenced by whether a group is discriminated
against de jure or de facto, stressing the need for a reconsideration of how we define
what a minority group is for remedial purposes.
3) The Equal Protection Discourse
Recognition of a group is a prerequisite to that group asserting an Equal
Protection Claim. But the group recognition this Article is concerned with is not the
commonly discussed nature of the group that is relevant to what level of judicial
review applies to laws affecting that group.25 Rather, the concept of group recognition
in this Article is unconcerned with what level of judicial review will apply, since a
group’s desire to be classified as a “suspect category” to receive the highest level of
judicial protection is not a struggle to be recognized as a group. For example, laws
discriminating against women are subject to a lower level of judicial scrutiny than
African-Americans, yet women are the clearest legally cognizable group.
The type of group recognition this Article is concerned with is the requirement
under the Equal Protection Clause that any group challenging a discriminatory act
have enough distinctiveness so as to have standing to raise the discrimination claim.26
This requirement under the Equal Protection Clause, although rarely discussed, is
crucial in pleading a constitutional violation: “the first step is to establish that the
group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment
under the laws, as written or as applied”.27 The Equal Protection Clause, thus
incorporates a group-based ideology even while maintaining the individualistic nature
24

Id, at 715.
See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 685-692 (7th ed., 2004).
26
This prerequisite is different from the “standing doctrine” requisite embedded in Article III of the
Constitution. See Constitutional Law: Cases, Comments, Questions 1507-1518 (Jesse H. Choper et al.,
9th ed., 2001).
27
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478479.
25
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of claims.28 That is, one being part of a group--and the sameness one shares with that
group--is necessary as a foundation for any individual allegation of discrimination. In
this context, the lack of legal recognition as a group that is evident in de facto
discriminated against groups like Mexican-Americans, means that these groups have
only a fragile, partial, and hesitant recognition. This limited recognition means that in
order to win an equal protection claim, the group identify must be constantly and
repetitively reassured before court. Thus, the effects of de jure discrimination
structurally limit the scope of equal protection that de facto discriminated groups
enjoy.
Part II: Formal De Jure Discrimination and its Effects – A Phenomenology
The de jure/de facto distinction offers a unique perspective on the way in
which discriminated groups are constructed. The distinction affects a group's
recognition in various ways through the different stages of discrimination and the
development

of

antidiscrimination

law.

The

difficulty,

however,

is

that

antidiscrimination law was initially based on the type of redressed discrimination
being de jure.29 Law is one important source from which people draw their sense of
reality and "realness." It is one of society's most reliable mechanisms of producing
reality or, as others sees it, of reflecting reality. It is the place where social consensus
and dominant beliefs are being realized.30 De jure discrimination creates "differences"
between groups, recognizes those differences, and construes those differences as
meaningful. Therefore, the absence of groups or their "differences" from society's
legal texts might signify their non-existence.

28

On the individualistic framework of the equal protection clause, see Kevin D. Brown, The Dilemma
of Legal Discourse for Public Educational Responses to the "Crisis" Facing African- American Males,
23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 63, 71-87 (1994). On the role of the clause as protecting groups, see Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 123-127 (1976). However, this
Article’s argument does not rely on a communal perception of the Equal Protection Clause, since even
an individual claimant needs to prove membership in a group.
29
Some scholarship has argued that the Court is approaching discrimination issues based on the
assumption of formal, blatant discrimination even though de jure discrimination almost is now rare. See
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.
J. 279, 285 (1997) (“As long as… blatant barriers do not exist, the Court has difficulty seeing
discrimination”).
30
This Article’s interest is not in the ideological controversy over the force of law as a sociological
move or the law’s role in creating social norms. See Introduction to Critical Race Theory: The Key
Writings That Formed the Movement, at xxiv (Kimberle W. Crenshaw et al., 1995).
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The Article will now trace the effects that the different types of discrimination
have on creating a group as a legal entity in the remedial stage.31 The effects are all
relevant to the way in which a discriminated-against group's status as a legal entity,
with legal relevance is generated. However, the effects themselves are somewhat
independent from one another and have a cumulative influence on the formation of
the group as legal entity, rather than having a gradual, dependent influence where one
effect flows from the other. Nevertheless, the common thread between these effects is
the way in which they allow the formation of de jure discriminated-against groups as
legal entities and the way the lack of these factors burdens de facto discriminatedagainst groups.
The effects of de jure discrimination that will be addressed in this Part
structure the ability of a group to participate in the remedial stage, thus structurally
barring groups that are "legally absent" from the discrimination discourse from
benefiting in

the curing stage.

For these "legally absent"

groups,

the

antidiscrimination battlefield is especially difficult, since they have to fight for redress
in an area where they were never formally injured.
1) The Distinctiveness through Alienation Effect
Discrimination is a form of alienation and it aims at excluding someone from
certain things or privileges. But, in order for there to be alienation, there must first be
identification and acknowledgment of the alienated group's existence in order to
frame that group as a distinct "other" that is subject to different treatment.
"Identifying" the characteristics of the subject upon which exclusion is based requires
that the subject has a distinctiveness common with the excluded group. From this
viewpoint, the discourse of discrimination can be understood as having been utilized
both as a means of causing the "other" to suffer from deprivation and alienation and
as a means of forming that same "other" group.32 But perhaps paradoxically, this
discriminating discourse retains some maneuvering potential since the legal language

31

In tracing these different stages, the Article does not intend to expose a coherent, consistent, and
gradual progress of the legal discourse on discrimination. Moreover, the different stages must have
been infused with and influenced one another and they may not even constitute some developmental
phases.Garry Peller, Frontier of Legal Thought III: Race Consciousness, 1990 Duke L. J. 758 (1990)
(considering some of the stages as a mere reflection of the opposing political ideologies of the
integrationist and the nationalist movements in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
32
This notion is compatible with Foucault’s perception of discrimination as an instrument for
establishing identities and differences. See Chris Horrocks, Introducing Foucault 64 (1999).

14
that the de jure discrimination employs plays into the hands of discriminated groups
when the remedial stage begins. Discriminated against groups can now use the same
classifying rhetoric that was used to define and exclude their group for their own
benefit. In a sense, then, discriminated groups are able to trap the legal system by its
own definitional creations. In other words, a group's distinct existence at the remedial
stage is a consequence of the group identity and knowledge that was produced by the
prior stage’s discriminatory discourse that recognized the group's “legal entity” by
discriminating against that group. This existence of a "legal entity" means that the
discriminated against group need not prove that the group has any "real" or essential
existence; rather, the fact that the legal system treated the group as real is sufficient.
The legal system, which creates this group identity and knowledge during the de jure
discrimination phase, cannot ignore or re-contextualize the group identity at the
remedial stage. Especially for racially categorized groups, whose composition is
socially ambiguous and often based on vague characterizations, this effect of the law
creating their legal identity is highly valuable in the remedial stage.33
The African-American group is a prominent illustration of this effect. The
distinctiveness of the group was created through various discriminatory provisions of
the law that needed to and shamelessly did define what a "Negro” was.34 These
definitions were designed to meet the need to statutorily identify a person for
exclusionary purposes35 and thereby created an indisputable "African-American legal
entity". Moreover, the legal system was indifferent to the divergent definitions used to
“identify” the group, as the notorious case of Plessy v. Ferguson demonstrates. In
Plessy, the Court considered Louisiana’s legal definition of African-Americans to be a
matter of state legislative autonomy.36 The Court specifically refrained from defining
the plaintiff’s race, indicating that so long as the segregation laws identified him as
“colored,” his unique racial condition was legally irrelevant.37 The Court settled for
the adoption of the statute’s language as the relevant legal definition for identifying
33
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the plaintiff's group. Adopting this definition also allowed the Court to ignore strong
objections to the notion that there is any “real” biological meaning to race.38
On the other hand, the courts desire to look to statutory definitions rather than
consider racial categorizations on their own initiative stood in the way of MexicanAmericans being recognized as a discriminated against group for remedial purposes.39
The first case to acknowledge Mexican-Americans as a legally identifiable non-white
group was Hernandez v. Texas,40 in 1954, where the Court concluded that the
systematic exclusion of Mexican-Americans from jury duty on the basis of their
“class” was unconstitutional.41 Nevertheless, in this decision the Court refused to
adopt a broad conception of the affected group and instead pointed to evidence about
the local discriminatory practices against Mexican-Americans; thus, the Court
established the existence of Mexicans-Americans as an identifiable class only within
specific circumstances.
Although celebrated as a landmark step toward achieving legal visibility for
Mexican-Americans,42 Hernandez also posed a difficult legacy for the group, since it
relied on a localized rather than nationalized conception of the "group." This localized
conception forced later Mexican-American petitioners to bear the heavy cost of
repeatedly establishing local discrimination in each case. Strangely enough, for
example, a plaintiff with a similar claim of discrimination in jury selection in Texas
was forced to again prove that he belonged to an identifiable group because his
petition related to different county than the one at issue in Hernandez.43 This legacy
caused courts to refuse to recognize the group's standing for purposes of equal
protection claims. Even in cases when it was decided that Mexican-Americans were a
discriminated against group, like in the important case of Cisneros v. Corpus Christi
38
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Ind. School District,44 the court’s language was never the definitive language that
would have recognized Mexican-Americans as a broad, rather than a local, group.
Lacking any de jure discrimination to define the group before it, the Court has looked
for "cultural", "biological", and "social" evidence to support the existence of
Mexican-Americans as a group.45 Moreover, the distinctive characteristics of
Mexican-American's – such as their surnames, cultural heritage, and appearance have constantly been questioned on the grounds that they lack social “realness” or
relevance to creating a group identity for Mexican-Americans. This confusion is
captured in the sincere struggle of courts and their inability to conclusively identify
the group before them:46
“It is clear to this court that Mexican-Americans, or Americans with
Spanish surnames, or whatever they are called, or whatever they would
like to be called, Latin-Americans, or several other new names of
identification -- and parenthetically the court will take notice that this
naming for identification phenomena is similar to that experienced in
the Negro groups: black, Negro, colored, and now black again, with an
occasional insulting epithet that is used less and less by white people…
fortunately…it is clear to this court that these people for whom we
have used the word Mexican-Americans to describe their class, group,
or segment of our population, are an identifiable ethnic minority…
This is not surprising; we can notice and identify their physical
characteristics, their language, their predominant religion, their distinct
culture, and, of course, their Spanish surnames.
In searching for "a name," and lacking any prior de jure definition of the
group, the court is forced to create the group on its own. Trying to come with an
acceptable definition, the court compares the naming difficulty with MexicanAmericans to the name changes that have accompanied the African-American group;
this comparison, though, exemplifies the differences between the groups caused by
their distinct discrimination forms. As opposed to court’s analogy, the "naming"
experiences of the two groups in fact diverged both in reason and in outcome. The
"list of names" for African-Americans that court lists represents the abundance of
identifications that were attached by de jure discrimination; thus, there was no
confusion or indeterminacy in the remedial stage, only different names attached to a
44
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well-defined group. Thus, these names have not compromised the ability of courts to
consistently identify the group before them as the same group of African-Americans.
The Mexican-American "list" of names, however, demonstrates the lack of any prior
legal definition of the group for court to rely upon at the curing stage.
Later cases in which court again held that Mexican-Americans are an
identifiable class, like the infamous Keyes case,47 have not yet had the allencompassing effect of creating group recognition.48 In sum, unlike AfricanAmericans, Mexican-Americans have to each time first constitute themselves as a
group and only then make their specific allegations of discrimination.
2) The Collaborating-Organizational Effect
The ability and potential of minorities to politically organize has a key role in
affecting their political power. Ackerman, who discusses minorities' entitlement to
judiciary protection, refers to the idea of a “pluralist democracy,” which assumes that
various interest groups negotiate with one another about the rules that they eventually
democratically legislate. Within this framework, minority groups suffer from a
systematic disadvantage, called the countermajoritarian difficulty, due to their lack of
power to negotiate with the powerful majority.49 A famous dictum by Justice Stone in
the Carolene Products case suggested that “discrete and insular minorities” were the
ones who suffered most from democratic ineffectiveness and were the ones who were
eligible for and entitled to protection from the judiciary when the legislature failed to
provide such protection. Ackerman criticizes the Court’s definition. Both insularity
and discreteness, he argues, have an empowering rather than a disempowering effect
on the political bargaining power of a group, since these characteristics make the
groups more able to operate collectively.50 Here, again, the powerful effect of de jure
discrimination is of enormous relevance. Legally institutionalized discrimination
enhances intra-group collectivity.51 Naturally, a group member's consciousness of
being discriminated against revolves around the notion of the group's oppression as a
whole, and formal, de jure discrimination makes that group oppression much more
powerful, painful, and outrageous. On the other hand, groups that do not suffer from
47
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blatant, evidential, formal discrimination, but rather suffer from more covert
discrimination, are expected to have a lesser sense of group identity and a higher level
of self-denial of their discriminated against position.
Using legislation to discriminate provokes a sharper sense of humiliation, of
otherness, and of alienated outsiderness.52 Reflecting this notion is Dean Ely’s
psychological approach to the legislative process, which represents de jure
discrimination as a positioning of the relations between the relevant groups in a “we”“they” dichotomy. "We" refers to the hegemonic oppressor, represented by the
legislative and "they" refers to the de jure discriminated against group.53 In this
framework, discrimination constitutes the other as a "minority", in the sense of a
majority manifesting political superiority over the minority and hence forcing the
minority to admit its relative political powerlessness and recognize its proper place
within social power relationships. For example, African-Americans, as the addressees
of the discriminating laws, could not see themselves as its authors.54 Understood this
way, a lack of de jure discrimination against a de facto discriminated group creates an
"we-all" as opposed to a "we-they" political structure, which eases any traces of
distinctiveness and discourages the development of a group consciousness among the
de facto discriminated against group.
This notion is clear in the Mexican-American case, where since MexicanAmericans suffered from de facto discrimination, they were treated by court as "the
other white," a group that deserved not to be discriminated against. This “other
white” strategy55 demonstrates the coalescing effect, where neither side in the
discriminatory regime develops a consciousness of real power relations between the
parties. Moreover, symbolically this strategy was a statement about the inclusiveness
of Mexican-Americans and their lack of distinctiveness from whites. In Mendez v.
Westminster School Dist. Of Orange County,56 where Mexican-Americans won the
right to have schools integrated because the court considered them to be "white"," the
court distinguished them from de jure discriminated against groups. Relying on
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California’s rules forbidding discrimination unless it was against colored and black
people, the court concluded that the discrimination against the plaintiffs was
unconstitutional. This decisions furthered the symbolic effect of the “we”-“they”
dichotomy, whereby Mexican Americans were placed within the “we” group and not
in the “they” group. Mexican-Americans were thus considered “one of the great
races” and contrasted with other races that were denied equal participation in
education.57 But this placement of Mexican-Americans in the "we" group fails to
acknowledge the power relations between Whites and Mexican-Americans. In this
power relationship, Mexican-Americans are a discriminated against minority, but the
court's decisions instead position Mexican-Americans side by side with whites. Thus,
de jure discriminated against groups, were marked as “the real” others, whereas
Mexican-Americans were not the other. This explains part of the difficulty Mexican
Americans had in their quest for recognition as a “group”.58
In the terms of Ackerman’s critique, the geographical insularity of the group is
less effective and the discreteness of the group is blurred with non-de jure
discriminated against groups. The consciousness of any group of its own identity is a
crucial prerequisite for any organized political action. Hence, the geographical
advantage is particularly effective where the group has a discrimination-oriented
consciousness and is less effective in cases where the group lacks such a
consciousness or where that consciousness is less pronounced. As history
demonstrates, although both African-Americans and Mexican Americans lived in
insularity as groups, the former was more able successfully to organize as a
community, to develop a racially proud consciousness, and eventually to better,
relatively speaking, their social status.59
This effect of de jure discrimination has been previously observed. In
criticizing the transition from the formal discrimination era of Jim Crow to the formal
equality era, Kimberle Crenshaw points to the problematic effects that this transition
has had on the African-American community. Crenshaw criticizes the fact that what
was primarily abolished through that transition was the symbolic oppression of
African-Americans represented by legal ordinances, rather than actual, material
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oppression, which consisted of less formal discriminating practices.60 AfricanAmericans derived much of the collective political power within their community
from the formal nature of their discrimination, not only vis-à-vis Whites, but also visà-vis themselves. The one-rule-to-all discrimination imposed upon African-Americans
by de jure discrimination had an inclusive effect and almost of all the community
members--even its most advantaged and pro-assimilationist members--were unable to
avoid or deny their belonging to the group. This discrimination imprisoned all of them
under its strict rules, without exception, rendering inefficient most assimilationist
strategies. Once the shift was made to the formal equality era, important portions of
the group, particularly those well-off or assimilationist African-Americans, parted
from it in what Crenshaw calls “the loss of collectivity.”61 Prior to that stage, even the
Integrationist Movement, a pro-assimilation movement, emphasized difference in its
agenda and had no illusions of African-Americans belonging to the white
hegemony.62 Dr. King, an integrationist himself, strictly called upon disobedience to
de jure discrimination.63 De jure discrimination was also the reason for the evolution
of and the main target of the revolutionary Black Civil Rights Movement,64 whose
consciousness was built upon fighting the evil of institutionalized discrimination. A
black scholar once wrote: "Law does not exist in a vacuum and racism is not solely a
by-product of law."65 This statement is an apt description of the mindset of the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960's. De jure discrimination has been a very powerful
motivation for the Movement’s admirable struggle.66
Crenshaw located her critique within the African-Americans and WhiteAmericans relations, but it can be easily applied to this Article's analysis within
discriminated-against groups. Unlike their African-American peers, MexicanAmericans did not suffer from blatant, formally legal alienation and thus were not as
easily considered-- either by themselves or by others--as “out-laws” from the social
60
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system. The lack of de jure discrimination caused Crenshaw’s “loss of collectivity”
within the Mexican-American consciousness and produced an imagined sense among
Mexican-Americans that they belonged to the hegemony. The absence of de jure
discrimination sent a message of assimilation and made an elaborated legal fight
appear irrelevant.67 The history of the Mexican-American civil rights movements thus
is more complex and assimilative than the history of the African-American civil rights
movement does. Organizations like the League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC), established in the late 1920's, and the Mexican American's Legal Defense
and Educational Fund (MALDEF), established in the late 1960's, took the lead in
litigating against the de facto discrimination Mexican-Americans suffered.68 They
relied overwhelmingly on an integrationist and assimilative ideology rather than on a
separatist or a group-collectivist ideology; perhaps partly for this reason, these groups
have failed to receive nationwide attention, despite their considerable achievements.69
Scholars speculate as to the conditions that have shaped this strategy, and the
suggestions have ranged from the community’s weak social and political condition to
an incompatibility among the personalities of the leadership.70 I suggest another
factor, namely the ambiguity on the part of the American legal system about the
group’s legal status. The fact that the law did not discriminatorily define the group has
had an anti-radical impact on the self-consciousness and self-perception of its
members and leaders with regard to their belonging to a discriminated against group.
Another aspect Ackerman points to is that the more discrete the members of a
group are, the easier it is to track them and commit them to the group’s political
struggle. African-Americans are an example of a discrete group, who because of their
skin color are easy to track; Ackerman presents homosexuals as a counterexample,
since their membership is more anonymous and not superficially prominent, thereby
making homosexuals harder to track and politically mobilize. Ackerman furthers
argues that even when tracked, a group member would have to let go of his or her
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anonymity in order to engage in a political struggle and that this revealing is
something members of anonymous groups would hesitate to do. By so doing, a
member of the anonymous group would risk “revealing” his or her identity and would
position himself or herself on a social battlefield.71 Ackerman's discussion of
"discreteness" focuses on the physical "visibility" of the group, but this Article
focuses on the legal dimension of discreteness. Once the group is visible to the law,
meaning that it has been defined and recognized by the legal system through de jure
discrimination, that group also becomes more politically visible. Thus, although
homosexuals are relatively "socially invisible," this Article argues that homosexuals
are substantively "legally present" and enjoy a substantial amount of political
visibility.
The discourse of sexual orientation-based discrimination dealt initially with
prohibitions on sodomy.72 Later, the struggle for homosexual rights targeted other de
jure provisions, again triggering a legal discussion that increased the legal visibility of
the group. Until Romer v. Evans,73the Court did not find homosexuals to constitute a
group that was entitled to special constitutional protections. Moreover, in the first case
to discuss homosexual's right to equal protection, Bowers v. Hardwick,74 the dicussion
revolved around homosexual activity rather than homosexuals as an entity or group.
But Romer led to the law considering homosexuals as a group, even though Romer
did not grant homosexuals all of the constitutional protection they sought. In Romer,
homosexuals were discriminated against de jure by a state constitution, so the Court’s
discussion also has a group-based orientation. Thus, the distinctiveness given to the
group by the legislature made the group legally viable.75
Considering groups that are discriminated against de facto extends
Ackerman’s conception of discreteness to a symbolic level where the law constitutes
presence. In contrast to homosexuals, members of de facto discriminated against
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groups suffer from “legal anonymity". They are locked in a legal closet, which
enhances their chances for assimilation and enables them to refrain from political
confrontations.76 In contrast, legally discrete groups who earn their discreteness from
de jure discrimination cannot as easily ignore or deny their oppression and are more
limited in their assimilation ability. Thus, members of these groups are far more likely
to be ready to organize politically to fight for better treatment. The legal discreteness
of de jure discriminated against groups also creates a supportive social-political
environment both among the group members and also in the form of goodwill from
people outside the group who support the abolition of the recognized de jure
discrimination.77
3) The visibility and witnessing effect or “unhappiness without a title is double
unhappiness”78
The legal discourse produces through discrimination not only a classification
of groups, but presence for those groups. Presence is therefore the signifie of
discrimination, its signifiant.79 De jure discrimination gives public presence to its
subjects and narrated their discriminated experience. In the remedial stage, the same
narrative that was used by the legal system for discrimination against the group is
used to justify giving anti-discrimination relief to the members of that group.
Moreover, number of different situations in which de jure discrimination existed
created multiple narratives of oppression and exclusion that had to be revealed in the
remedial stage: where de jure discrimination ordered segregated schools, the narrative
of exclusion from the education system had been told; where it ordered employment
segregation, the narrative of exclusion from the employment market had been told;
and so forth. These narratives of discrimination, suffering, and deprivation were
outlined by de jure regulations and affected the transparency and visibility of both the
group’s existence and the group's oppression.
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This effect is part of a larger theoretical scheme of "visibility," emphasizing
the powerfulness of the legal discourse, which excludes minorities by their absence
them from legal texts and reasoning. This absence from the law's formal and
substantive foundations designate the excluded party as the "other" and demonstrate
that its need are as unimportant to the legal world as they are elsewhere in society.80
The argument of this Article exceeds the limits of this "invisibility" critique. It argues
that “absence” refers not only to absence from receiving the benefits of the law, but
also an absence from suffering from the drawbacks of the law, specifically being
absent from the legal discrimination mechanism. The alleged invisibility of de jure
discriminated-against groups marks them as the "other," whereas the absence of de
facto discriminated-against groups signifies their complete non-existence.81 For
example, using legal language to determine the "nature" of a person in order to
classify him or her under a Jim Crow statute's requirements shapes the notion of a
legal category. Silence, on the other hand, is a choice not only not to include but also
a choice at the same time not to exclude. Silence is the decision to "non-clude." By
"non-cluding," this Article means a situation where a group is being discriminated
against yet is not being subjugated by explicit formal expressions of the law. The
group is fully "named" by society's coercion since it suffers from discrimination, but
is nameless under the law. Moreover, it does not exist as a group or entity. Although it
is true that discriminated-against groups such as women and African-Americans also
suffered from injustice and inequality that might be termed "lawlessness," they were
at the same time subject to the control of the legal system and thus were subject to
lawfulness.82 These groups are therefore relatively visible on the spectrum of
"visibility"; in contrast, Mexican-Americans fall into a category of extreme
invisibility.
De facto discriminated against groups extends another extreme of the visibility
spectrum. “Invisibility” is commonly used to describe also the omnipresence of a
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group that need not be “named”, rather than describe the non-existence of the “unnamed” group. In race and feminist critical theory, the invisible “un-named” is the
group whose dominance and hegemony shapes the relevant social system and thus
does not need to be explicitly named and presented.83 In legal terms, critical theory
argues that the law represents the white-male-heterosexual epistemology and lifeexperience and thus this group does not need to be named in the law.84 Therefore, this
archetype's absence from the legal texts is misleading since it reflects the group's
constituting presence. In this Article, however, the terminology of “un-naming” is
being used in a different manner. By “un-named” groups, this Article means those
that suffer from an impotent absence, and not from an all-encompassing
omnipresence. This Article contrasts the “naming” of minorities, such as AfricanAmericans and women, not only with the “un-naming” of the dominant group of
white men but also with the “un-naming” of other discriminated-against groups.
Considering these other discriminated-against groups visible challenges the traditional
conceptualization of “naming” as exclusionary and “un-naming” as inclusive. Instead,
this Article suggests a broader conception that will treat the “un-named”
discriminated groups as being as invisible as a group can be.
The theoretical scheme of "invisibility" this Article addresses is affected by
the legal visibility of the group as follows. Different, relative degrees of legal
visibility and invisibility are located on a continuum. At one end there are laws that
make the "otherness" of the laws' subject explicit. For example, laws denying access
to public facilities that specifically named "Blacks" made the "otherness" of AfricanAmericans apparent. In this case the discriminated group is more overtly
distinguished than with laws where the ban is, for example, on "Colored" people,
which is a general term encompassing various non-white groups.85 Next to these
explicit laws on the continuum are implied laws, such as laws with a "whites only"
requirement. This sort of implicit law does not "name" the other, rather "names" the
opposite, privileged entity. Here, the group's absence could nevertheless signify its
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existence because of the statute’s “wholeness” impact. According to this impact,
discriminatory statutes are always positioned within a semantic field of "social power
relations" where the oppressor and oppressed groups are "different" from one another
and can signify one another.86 In the relatively narrow area of legal discrimination,
naming the privileged group in a statute signifies the discriminated group as missing
from the holistic frame of the oppressor and the oppressed, namely, from the statute's
wholeness. For example, due to the black-white paradigm, "African-Americans" are
members of a set of mutually exclusive forms of discrimination with "whites" as their
opposite. This dichotomy is why statutorily privileging a "white" group would signify
the presence of its "other," specifically African-Americans, but not, for example, the
presence of Mexican-Americans, since Mexican-Americans are not the dichotomous
opposite of "whites" and thus are not signified by the inclusion of "whites". Alongside
this spectrum of visibility, both explicit and implicit de jure discrimination enhances
the formation of the discriminated group as an entity.
In sum, de jure discrimination affects the magnitude of the visibility both of
the existence of the group itself and of its discrimination-based suffering. Working
from within the legal system, de jure discrimination brought the groups it defined into
canonical legal texts. Law canonizes discriminated groups, providing them the
necessary "naming" for all prospective antidiscrimination purposes during a later
remedial stage.87 Being named by the law has implications just as being named by the
social sphere or by politicians would. Formal de jure discrimination is more
systematic and more exposed to the public than de facto discrimination is, thereby
conveying greater visibility to the subjects of that discrimination. This effect helps
explain the weak position of Mexican-Americans in the American antidiscrimination
discourse. Although Mexican-Americans are relatively physically distinct, their
recognition as a discriminated-against group has lacked any “legal” support since they
were not discriminated-against by the law; this lack of "legal" support deprives the
group of legal viability in asserting their claims during the remedial stage.
4) The Moral Blameworthy and Institutional Legitimacy Effect
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Antidiscrimination rules are meant to rectify the countermajoritanian
difficulties minorities face and to redress harmful injuries that the law or society has
inflicted upon them. 88 Therefore, institutional legitimacy and moral blameworthiness
suggest that it is important for the same legal mechanisms that discriminated to be the
mechanisms used to provide the remedies. In other words, de jure discrimination
provides direct, formal access to the legal system's remedial functions for de jure
discriminated-against groups. The formalism of the legal system and the documentary
nature of de jure discrimination make such discrimination unforgettable to the legal
system. De jure discrimination is less likely or plausibly to be denied than de facto
discrimination is. Although nations tend to forget their historical evils,
institutionalized documents make such forgetfulness harder. A legislative and
adjudicative change of hearts does not erase the legal history of a nation, but rather
place another narrative next to that history. Discriminatory legal rules can be
expunged from a nation’s book of statutes, but their past existence viability is always
evident and traceable. The vast documentation of the Jim Crow regulations and the
judicial revisiting of Dred Scott89 and Plessy demonstrate the strong presence of the
past institutional suffering of African-Americans. This documented past was during
the remedial stage a source for vast legal condemnation of the past institutional
suffering and thus a firm justification for remediation.90
De jure discrimination powerfully situates its subjects within the legal system
as the subjects of legal practice. Reflecting again on Ackerman’s work, one might
observe that the judiciary restricts its activism with regard to “non-legal” issues. The
judiciary's commitment to protecting discrete and insular minorities assumes some
prior legal recognition of such minority groups. Therefore, it is crucial to understand
the discrete and insular minorities test as being inherently legal. This test aims at
protecting groups from de jure discrimination alone. Other forms of discrimination
are not thought of as proper areas for judicial intervention due to the traditional
legal/social dichotomy that seeks to preserve the "social" as a sphere beyond equality
law and thus that allows for the continuation of racial inequality outside the official
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reach of the state.91 As this Article has previously argued, Mexican-Americans were
only partially recognized by the legal system. Since they did not suffer from de jure
discrimination, it was easier to consider Mexican-Americans to be a “social” rather
than a “legal” entity. The Court’s reluctance to declare that the discrimination against
Mexican-Americans was de jure meant that Mexican-Americans had no legal
relevance as a group. In the Hernandez case, the Court focused to “social”
motivations for discrimination rather than “legal” ones, thus deriving the “emergence”
of the Mexican-American group within this specific from a change in "community
prejudices" against them. Moreover, the wisdom of the Court's reliance on "social
changes" triggering recognition of Mexican-Americans is challenged by the fact that
discrimination against Mexican-American was by far long lasting.92 In the case of de
jure discriminated-against groups, the law’s involvement transformed what might
have otherwise been considered a "wholly social" matter in to a “wholly legal” one,
by establishing the group as having legal viability. For example, in the famous case of
Strauder v. West Virginia,93 the Court focused on the devastating impact of de jure
discrimination in excluding African-Americans from “civil society.” This observation
conceives the social harm inflicted on them as also being a legal harm.
Conservative legal theories and positive legalism claim that law merely
reflects society's desires. The critique from the left, on the other hand, argues that the
law is actively involved in the production and maintenance of society's power
relations. This debate, though, is less important once legal involvement is present in
the wronging. Through de jure discrimination the legal system created as well as
reflected reality, unraveling the line between the legal and the social realms.94 Under
these circumstances, adherence to the legal righting process is to be expected, because
once the law had been formally involved in "wronging," there is a need for it to
reverse its involvement. The high attention that de jure discriminated-against groups
receive from the legal system during the remedial stage can be understood as a result

91

This tactic is well-established in American equality laws. See Angela P. Harris, Symposium on Law
in the Twentieth Century: Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth Century Race Law,
88 Calif. L. Rev. 1923, 1935 (2000).
92
For the history of the subordination and oppression of Mexican-Americans, see Arnold De Leon,
They Called Them Greasers: Anglo Attitudes Toward Mexicans in Texas 1821-1900 (1983).
93
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
94
Kennedy, supra note 81, at 347.

29
of a corrective justice desire to right past undeniable wrongs that were caused by the
legal system itself.95
Affirmative action is the most prominent manifestation of this effect.
Although the American legal system had not yet developed a well-established
position as to affirmative action's constitutionality or normative desirability,
affirmative action programs have nonetheless been judicially approved.96 The
inclination of courts in these cases to generally hold against general affirmative action
programs while approving programs that aim to remedy concrete legal discrimination
highlights the importance of de jure discrimination. The more concrete and unjust the
past discrimination was--particularly if such discrimination resulted from the legal
system itself rather than simply from society--the more justified present affirmative
action is.97 This is the essence of antidiscrimination law, as Robert Post describes it:
“…antidiscrimination law always begins and ends in history, which means that it
must participate in the very practices that it seeks to alter and regulate.”98 The
involvement of the judiciary benefiting de jure discriminated-against groups in the
remedial stage can thus be understood as being motivated by institutional
remorsefulness.99
5) The Intentional Discrimination Presumption Effect
The de jure/de facto distinction has an active role in determining the intent or
purpose in the challenged discriminatory act. The presence of de jure discrimination
is an important factor in establishing an act as intentional. An example of this role is
the Court's statement that the intent behind explicit de jure discrimination in the past
may be used in the present to prove intent regardless of chronological remoteness.100
95
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Unsurprisingly, this logic was applied primarily in cases where de jure discrimination
previously existed.101 The practical implication of this logic is large because equal
protection claims are limited to claims that can prove intentional discrimination, and
this logic allows the court to assume intentional discrimination. This logic thus has a
"narrating" effect, where it allows the group's narrative of oppression to be told.102
Moreover, the "narrating" effect also has an epistemological effect by causing the
narrated information to be absorbed into the formal legal system and used by the
narrating group to achieve redress for past discrimination. In other words, the logic is
that the institutionalization of de jure discrimination signified a pattern of oppressive
behavior that could be used to prove intentionality, whereas de facto discrimination
was perceived as non-institutional, incidental, and random and thus could not be used
to prove the intentionality necessary to assert an equal protection claim.103
6) The Non-legal Effect of De Jure Discrimination
This Article does not discuss the vast set of reciprocal relations between law,
discrimination, and society, since those are beyond its scope. This Article instead will
simply note the unique influence de jure discrimination has upon the formation of a
legally cognized group.104
First, it is important to note that there is no strict, clear relations between the
legal status of a group and the social status of a group as one that is discriminated
against. Some groups may not be discriminated-against by the law and yet suffer
discrimination from society. De facto discriminated-against groups demonstrate this
idea well. At the same time, some groups may be de jure discriminated against by the
law without being discriminated against by society in fact.105 Nevertheless, in
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between these poles, there is certainly a correlation between the use of the law to
order society and between enhancing the social and self-awareness around a group
subjugated to de jure discrimination. Once discrimination is institutionalized in law,
that legal discrimination distinguishes the group from the rest of society and implies
the “realness” of the differences recognized by the law. Recognition by the law also
makes visible (and harder to deny) at least some of the suffering by the discriminatedagainst group. Thus, by removing a group from society's legal canon and by no longer
discriminating against that group under the law, this removal creates some social
commitment to equality vis-a-vis that group.106 These impacts are relevant both to the
discriminated-against group and the discriminating group. De jure discriminatedagainst group members are better positioned to develop the self-consciousness about
their position that is needed for that group to initiate an effective legal and political
struggle for rights.
A story of a Mexican-American battle against discrimination will help to
illustrate this effect. The story, called the Felix Longoria Incident, occurred in Texas
in 1949. Longoria was an American soldier who died during World War II. The local
mortician refused to allow him to be buried at the chapel because of Longoria’s
Mexican origin.107 Hector Garcia, an activist working for a Mexican-American Forum
challenged this discrimination. As with most of the discriminatory acts against
Mexican-Americans in Texas, the burial refusal was not de jure based. As
demonstrated by the fact that this case received substantial sympathetic public
attention, the public reaction to the discrimination, which in general denied it, was of
a different nature than if the discrimination had been based in law and hence “legal”.
The incident was portrayed as an atypical incident, even though in fact separate burial
services and cemeteries were common. It was resolved as a misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of the funeral house owner's words. Since the mortician's behavior
lacking any official approval in law, the public blamed Garcia for stirring up trouble
in an area where problems did not truly existed
enforced, the statute has caused anguish to and has been widdely criticized as being derogating to
Native Americans.
106
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These types of public denials of the reality of discrimination are typical with
non-de jure discrimination. Similar de jure discrimination could not have been
denied. The truth of de jure discrimination neither relies on matters of interpretation
over “what exactly has been said” nor does it rely on the credibility of the party
alleging discrimination, since in both cases the law is clearly authorizing
discrimination. Since de jure discrimination is institutionalized, it's effect cannot be
dismissed as a private, unrepresentative dispute as de facto discrimination often can
be. Declaring war on de jure discrimination is more likely to generate public support
than war on de facto discrimination, to which the public might respond as it did to
Garcia's work that the activists are just stirring up trouble. De jure discrimination is
more difficult to rationalize or deny. As a result, this de facto discrimination case with
the Texas burial was resolved on a very local, specific level and the mortician agreed,
eventually, to bury Longoria.
Conclusion: A Structural Effect
The formal, overt, linguistic dimension of different forms of discrimination
has powerful effects that both courts and scholars have up until now neglected. The
language structure of de jure discrimination reflected and embodied the view of the
world and the nature of reality.108 As with any discourse, the discrimination discourse
dictates the way in which discriminated groups are construed and imposes
frameworks that structure what can be experienced or what meaning an experience
can encompass. Thus, discourse influences what can be said, thought, and done. Since
the discrimination discourse is framed in the context of de jure discrimination, it helps
to prevent the formation of group identities with de facto discriminated-against
groups, the nature of whose composition might be more complex, contextualized, and
historicized than the composition of de jure discriminated against groups.109 Thus, the
primacy of de jure discrimination in the discrimination discourse shaped the way in
which the formation of "legally cognized groups" became possible and thereby
limited the antidiscrimination discourse to encompassing primarily de jure
discriminated against groups. De jure discrimination structured what could or could
108
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not be included in the discrimination discourse; most importantly, the dominance of
de jure discrimination largely prevented de facto discriminated groups from
participating in the antidiscrimination discourse.
Part III:
The Effects on the Battle for Segregation in Education in the States
The impact of the abovementioned effects on equal protection doctrine is
somewhat elusive and will be introduced in this Part by examining the segregation in
education litigation of both African and Mexican Americans. The impact is more
apparent in the Mexican-American litigation, where the court refused to identify the
group, and less apparent in African-American litigation, where the court refrained
from any similar discussion of group identity. Rulings on education segregation
regarding theses groups demonstrate this difference in impact. Both groups suffered
from segregation in education, but while African-Americans suffered mainly from de
jure discrimination, Mexican-Americnas suffered almost exclusively from de facto
discrimination. In terms of judicial success, Mexican-Americans were the firsts to win
a segregation battle, in the Mendez case in 1946.110. But African-Americans won the
war in the broader legal sense with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.111 Although
vastly criticized,112 this decision is a cornerstone of abolishing segregation and the
"separate but equal" doctrine. A compelling explanation for Brown's central status in
the discrimination discourse might be its emphasis on African-Americans' suffering
and social exclusion through de jure discrimination. The NAACP, which argued the
case, narrated African-American suffering through briefs and professional opinions
and court embraced that narrative,113 stressing the story of the group’s oppression:
"To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone".114 Court thus
brought the suffering of African-American children--and through them the African110
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American people--into the legal system and made that suffering intrinsic to the
group's legal entity. The institutionalized discrimination at issue in the case also
represented the broader story of discrimination of educational bodies against AfricanAmericans.115 In Brown, Court has recognized the existence of a suffering,
discriminated-against group. Introducing the petitioners as “minors of the Negro
race,” Court has affirmed, and acknowledged without reservations their status as a
legally identifiable group.116
The impact of Brown was "legal recognition," as Derrick Bell states: "The
significance of this decision is that it altered the status of African-Americans who
were no longer supplicants … 'seeking, pleading, begging to be treated as full-fledged
members of the human race….'"117 More importantly, from Brown onward, the
viability of every segregation claim brought into court by African-Americans was
immediately and fully discussed. No special epistemological effort was required by
courts to define the petitioners or their discriminated-against position. This ease of
asserting claims was the unfelt yet crucial impact of de jure discrimination, which
established African-Americans’ group recognition. The conceptualization of the
litigation as one seeking equality between different identifiable groups prompted
African-Americans seeking for equality to bring their segregation claims to court. De
jure discrimination thus had a structural effect that enabled the group to gain control
over attempts to reshape the educational system.118
The experience of Mexican-Americans seeking to gain legal recognition as a
group differed tremendously from that of African-Americans.119 As this Article has
argued earlier, the discrimination against Mexican-Americans was primarily non-de
jure and their status as a legally cognizable minority group is fragile.120 The scarcity
of legislation related to Mexican-Americans led to an insufficient amount of litigation
by or against Mexican-Americans, which prevented a coherent and a comprehensive
identity of the group and its real suffering from forming. Mendez, one of the few cases
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to have dealt with de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans, is thus
unsurprisingly considered a milestone in the group's struggle for equality.
Nevertheless, the Mendezdecision blurred the legal status of Mexican -Americans as
an identifiable group and blurred their suffering. Considering them to be "whites," the
court said that since they were "whites" they were not appropriate subjects for
discriminatory treatment since state law did not allow for discrimination against
whites.121 This strategy of labeling Mexican-Americans as white was destructive to
Mexican-Americans, since it did not mesh with social behavior toward MexicanAmericans or with the power relation from which Mexican-Americans suffered.122
And with this rare de jure discrimination case, it is clear that a statute explicitly
allowing de jure segregation of Mexican-Americans would have destroyed the court's
reasoning; if de jure segregation had been applied against Mexican-Americans, it
could have surfaced the suffering of the Mexicans-American group.
Mendez was followed by Gonzales v. Sheely,123 in which a federal court in
Arizona ruled on a segregation claim. Like Mendez, this case was also highly
atypically and based on de jure discrimination against Mexican-Americans. In
Gonzales, the court identified the petitioners before him as a class based on the fact
that the regulations allowed the segregation of “all children of persons of Mexican or
Latin descent or extraction”; thus, the court used this de jure “naming” of the group in
its ruling.124 Court also referred to such blatant segregation as degrading and fostering
antagonism against and inferiority in Mexican-American children.125 In later cases,
however, where the discrimination was not de jure as in Mendez and Gonzales, legal
recognition of Mexican-Americans as a group has not been forthcoming. Courts,
frightened by their inability to determine precisely the contours of the group,
continued to only apply ad-hoc group recognition to the specific petitioners before the
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court rather than recognize Mexican-Americans as a group more generally.126 Without
a general recognition for the group, the group members had to reassert and reconstruct
each time the group identity in order to assert discrimination claims. Later on, the
prerequisite that challenged discrimination be de jure rather than de facto blocked
many other petitions challenging discrimination against Mexican-Americans.127
Along with other factors, the effects of the discrimination against Mexican-Americans
being de facto rather than de jure can help understand how in contrast to AfricanAmericans, Mexican-Americans today continue to attend the most segregated schools
and today they are "more segregated" and "more concentrated in high-poverty schools
than any other group of students” in the United States.128
The end of Jim Crow in the late-1950’s and the passage of the Civil Rights
Acts in the mid-1960’s signified the end of de jure discrimination and, with it, the end
of the immediate effects of the de jure/de facto distinction. America has gradually
moved from the discriminating stage and entered into the remedial stage, which
utilized a colorblind notion, whereby reason and neutrality replaced prejudice and
stereotyping, which governed de jure discrimination rhetoric.129 The shift between the
stages symbolized a shift from negotiating equality through difference to negotiating
it through sameness, and the gap between discriminated-against groups has
narrowed.130 Mexican-Americans (as well as other non-de jure discriminated-against
groups, for example Arabs) became actors that were allowed to use antidiscrimination
relief in their favor and allowed to gradually forming a "discriminated group"
identity.131 The use of more flexible terms like “national origin” to describe groups
against which discrimination is prohibited has an inclusive effect of helping establish
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group identity for many de facto discriminated-against groups.132 Likewise, the
“unreasonable classification” discourse that evolved during this colorblind era
displaced the racial oppression discourse, which was a key factor in making
recognized group as a discriminated-against one.133 Within this new system, the status
of de facto discriminated-against groups has improved because these changes have
given hope for recognition of the group and for full participation in antidiscrimination
relief.134 Moreover, the Civil Rights Acts banned a larger range of discriminatory
practices than just simple de jure ones, including relatively “private” forms that were
closer to de facto discrimination. The Civil Rights Acts banned both intentional and
unintentional discrimination and has largely departed from the old view of the Equal
Protection Clause primarily redressing de jure discrimination.135 These notions have
influenced the recognition of groups in equal protection claims. With MexicanAmericans, in this era the group began to be recognized as either a “race” or as a
“national origin.”136 In contrast, in the new legal order where de jure discrimination
has ceased, the powerful effects of legal symbolization of African-American racial
existence and suffering led to the false belief that racism ended, even though the
material subordination of African-Americans has not stopped. Rather, discrimination
against African-Americans has become more de facto-based than de jure-based, and
has thus become harder to fight.137
Part IV: The Missing Discrimination Paradigm of Streaming from De Facto to
De Jure: The Case for Mizrahis' Discrimination in Israel
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Against this background, this Article now focuses on the Mizrahi Jews, who
suffer no de jure discrimination. As opposed to the case of Mexican-Americans,
Mizrahis in Israel have not managed to break through the absence that non-de jure
discrimination forces upon them and they have no recognition in the Israeli
antidiscrimination discourse. Both Mexican-Americans and Mizrahis are positioned in
limiting socio-political dialectics: the former in the American black/white dialectic
and the latter in the Zionist Arab/Jew dialectic. The difference is that this dialectic
marginalized discrimination against Mexican-Americans, yet in Israel, it barred any
recognition of Mizrahis. The worse position of Mizrahis is a consequence of their
unique condition, where the Israeli legal system maintains the dialectic by considering
the Mizrahis as part of the un-discriminated-against group contrasted with ArabIsraelis, who are Israel’s ultimate de jure discriminated-against group. The differences
between Mizrahis and Mexican-Americans suggest that considering the unique
circumstances of the Israeli case will help to demonstrate the extremity of this
Article's argument.138
This section examines the Israeli discourse over segregation in education and
how that discourse made the Mizrahis as legally "invisible" group.

1) The Double Oppression of Mizrahis
Israeli Jewish society's most fundamental division is an ethnic one between
Mizrahis and Ashkenazis.139 Ashkenazis have historically been the dominant and
privileged group, while Mizrahis have been the low status group.140 Mizrahis suffer
from structural injustice and discrimination, have a high unemployment rate, comprise
a disproportionate percentage of Israeli prison and social welfare population, and have
substantial educational under-achievement. These deficiencies have been steady or, if
anything, increasing over Israel’s six decades of statehood.141 This poor position of
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Mizrahis is a result of lingering discrimination against them, which began with the
Mizrahis' immigration to Israel the in the early 1950's when the Ashkenazis held
political, social, and cultural power in the early days of the modern state of Israel.
“Mizrahis” is a social and cultural category that was invented by the Ashkenazis in
order to legitimize the Ashkenazis' own existence, identity, and hegemony, in much
the same manner as Orientalism was invented by the colonial west.142 Ashkenazis,
including both the founders of Israel and later immigrants from Europe, considered
themselves to be a representative of Europe that faced a primitive Asian East,
specifically, Arabs and Arab-Jews.143
Discriminatory policies against Mizrahis are both observationally obvious and
academically supported. While their fellow Ashkenazi immigrants were given
preferences in public services, Mizrahi immigrants were subject to economic and
cultural oppression.144 They suffered from differential and discriminatory land
distribution and housing policy, which force them to settle in Israel’s wasteland and
prevented them from owning private property; this oppression is still prevalent
today.145 Mizrahis were also deprived of fair and equal access to education and
suffered tremendous cultural oppression.146 Nevertheless, Israeli society denies (or at
the least debates and doubts) that Mizrahi oppression and discrimination exists.147 The
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ill situation of the Mizrahis is often rationalized as resulting from differences in merit
or on immigration difficulties.148 The most institutionalized rationalization is the
"crisis of modernization" from which the Mizrahis allegedly suffer when they moved
from what is perceived as the barbarian-like Arab culture into the "modern" European
culture represented by the Ashkenazi population. Thus, the Ashkenazi adopted
measures to modernize the Mizrahis, such as special segregated education and low
quality employment.149 These measures ended up creating an informal but still present
system of segregation and discrimination between the Mizrahis and Ashkenazis.
In one of the rare discussions of the Mizrahi group in the Israeli legal
discourse, a Mizrahi scholar has observes:150
What were the legal manifestations of the status of Mizrahi Jews? The issue is
much more subtle than that of the status of Israeli Arabs or women. In the case
of Arabs and women, explicit legal norms discriminated or at least recognized
differences. With regard to the Mizrahim, Israeli law appears to have been
blind. Formally they have been treated as equal…
A review of Israeli statutes and documented judicial decisions supports this argument,
since no legal actor has ever explicitly or formally categorized the “Mizrahi” as a
group with an independent identity and independent challenges.151 Although this
conclusion fits well with the absence of a Mizrahi group in Israeli culture,152 the
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difficulty is that the categorizations of Mizrahis have been entertained by officials.153
But formally, the legal system has adopted a melting pot ideology that supports the
Zionist ethos of one land for all Jews. The Israeli Law of Return of 1950154 declares
the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel, supplemented by a provision in the
Nationality Law of 1952 that grants automatic Israeli citizenship to every immigrant
Jew.155 This mechanism proposed a unifying, sameness-based, all-Jew encompassing
de jure rhetoric; this rhetoric largely hid the Mizrahis' suffering from de facto
discrimination and has made the legal sphere both structurally and symbolically
irrelevant to the Mizrahi struggle for equality.156
A key factor to understanding the invisibility of the Mizrahis is their relative
position in Israeli society, where race-like discrimination places them next to ArabIsraelis. The Arab-Israelis are the most prominent group to be legally recognized in
the Israeli antidiscrimination discourse as being discriminated against; this
discrimination is both de jure and de facto. The Israeli legal system discriminates
against all of its non-Jewish citizens, but within the Israeli social context this
discrimination primarily harms its Arab citizens.157 The Israeli legal system is
constitutional, even though it has no formal constitution. Some statutes, which are
called “Basic-Laws”, have a constitutional normative status and they represent the
Israeli system’s legal and institutional foundations.158 Israel bans through a
constitutional basic-law any non-Jewish ownership of lands,159 and states explicitly
that the spouses of Israel's Arab citizens do not acquire Israeli citizenship by the act of
marriage.160 Israeli-Arabs are in a unique position, where on the one hand they are de
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jure discriminated against, while on the other hand they enjoy an number of
antidiscrimination laws that work in their favor in "civil" contexts. After decades of
suffering discrimination, in the past two decades the Israeli Supreme Court and
legislature have demonstrated a gradual willingness to apply antidiscrimination rules
and affirmative actions to benefit Arab-Israelis.161 In this remedial stage, Arab-Israelis
are nevertheless still largely de jure discriminated-against, as the abovementioned
statutes shows.162 As a result, unlike America's efforts to eliminate the alienation of
non-white communities by adopting a colorblind consciousness during the remedial
stage, in Israel the Arabs are treated as fundamentally different from Jews even at the
remedial stage.

2) Segregation and Integration in Israel between De Jure and De Facto
In Israel, the Mizrahi minority has suffered from segregation, mainly in
education and in residency. This segregation has played and continues to play a
central role in shaping the Mizrahis' poor social condition. But this segregation was
not administered through an explicit de jure system but rather through informal
decisions and actions in a way that had a crucial impact on the structure of the
Mizrahis' battle for equality.
In the early 1970’s, the Israeli government, aware of the de facto segregation
against Mizrahis in education, decided to adopt a correctional “integration in
education” plan for Mizrahis and Ashkenazis.163 It was only then, at what might be
identified as the beginning of the remedial stage, that the first legal petitions about
segregation in education begun. However, these petitions were advanced exclusively
by Ashkenazis who opposed the plan. An Israeli scholar noted this exclusivity
suggested that it resulted from the low accessibility the poor Mizrahi population had
161
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to courts.164 I find this reasoning unpersuasive because of the total exclusion of
Mizrahi petitions; rather, I suggest that structural legal barriers, caused by the de facto
nature of the discrimination from which the Mizrahis suffer, contributed to the sharp
differences in the number of petitions and that these barriers made it almost
impossible for Mizrahis as a de facto discriminated-again group to cross the judicial
barriers that this discrimination shaped
The Israeli Supreme Court has consistently supported the integration plan.
Nevertheless, the absence of de jure discrimination against Mizrahis forced the Israeli
Supreme Court to use a rather manipulative discourse. The first case to deal with this
integration was Kremer v. Municipality of Jerusalem,165 in which the Ashkenazi
petitioners refused to send their children to an integrated school as mandated by the
integration plan. The case was heard in May 1971. Three weeks earlier a group of
thousands young Mizrahis--who were second generation of Mizrahi immigrants born
in the 1950’s--lead a famous and extremely atypical Mizrahi protest march (which
devolved into riots) against the discrimination and oppression of Mizrahis in Israel.
Although the entire country was aware of this protest, the majority of the Israeli
Supreme Court chose to ignore the social context in which its ruling was made.166
Instead, the Israeli Supreme Court used neutral words and referred to the integration
plan as an effort to overcome the gap between "different ethnicities" rather than
explicitly naming Ashkenazis and Mizrahis. One Justice, however, noted in his
concurrence the plan's focus on Mizrahis. This concurrence, though, was, the first and
last time that a court made a direct judicial reference to the Mizrahis. From this case
on, the Israeli desegregation discourse proceeded in a non-contextual, non-naming,
“invisibilizing” manner. The equalizing purpose of the integration plan was apparent,
but rather than name it as such, the end goal of the plan was described only by the
broad and blurry phrase of an “equal Israeli society”. At first, the plan's goal was to
merge between different ethnic communities,167 but over time this goal has lost its
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significance in the court’s rhetoric and it was substituted by him. In later incarnations,
the plan was described as trying to merge "the strong and the weak,"168 but eventually,
the court abandoned this mildly ethnic rhetoric and began to stress narrowing the
economic gap as the plan’s main goal.
This type of reasoning embodies some of the structural barriers that the
Mizrahis faced as a de facto discriminated-against group; that is, the structural
barriers are that the Israeli legal system has worked to limit the possibility of the
Mizrahis being recognized as a discriminated-against group. The most interesting
structural effect is that in contrast to the American system--where anti-discrimination
is designed to advance an integrative ideology-- the Israeli discourse has never
focused on discrimination.169 The Israeli Supreme Court did not regard any of these
cases as presenting questions of discrimination. The lack of a formal de jure
substantiation of school segregation allowed the court to base its opinions on
administrative and technical points while leaving the notion of discrimination and the
racism of the Ashkenazi petitioners untouched. Indeed, somewhat perversely, the only
discrimination discussed in these cases is the petitioners’ claims that forcing them to
attend integrated schools discriminate against them. Another prominent contrast to the
American experience is that the Mizrahis are largely absent from the segregation
cases. Except for a single mention in the Kremer case, the courts have used the neutral
and blurred language of "various ethnic-groups" rather than naming the Mizrahis
explicitly. This misleading usage has stripped the involved groups of their identity as
well and ignored the realities of the power relations between groups by trying to make
it seem as if all the groups were and shared the same “melting pot” aspiration for
integration. Although desegregation was presented as a mutual need for diversity from
which both the Mizrahis and Ashkenazis would benefit. Rather, the goal of the plan
was to stop the lingering segregation in education from which Mizrahis suffered and
to block the Ashkenazi flight from Mizrahi educational surroundings. The neutral
language the court employed when describing the conflict concealed this
phenomenon.

described as creating a merger of "various ethnicities and social levels", Kremer, supra note 165, at
770; Shaul v. Jerusalem City Council, 29(ii) P.D. 804, 806 (1976).
168
Cheshin v. Dr. Hochberg, 42(iv) P.D. 285, 287 (1988).
169
Analyzing the Court's role in implementing the integration plan in Israel, an Israeli scholar noted its
similarity to the African-American experience. Rosen-Zvi, supra note 139, at 28-29. Obviously, both
the facts and the argument in this Article render such similarity impossible.

45
Both the discriminating and remedial practices toward the Mizrahis were nonde jure and informal. But interestingly, during both stages, the Israeli Ministry of
Education has published internal documents using the pedagogical classification of
"Teunei Tipuach" (students in need of special nurture). Until the mid- 1990’s, this
classification applied explicitly and exclusively to Mizrahis.170 The implications of
this classification were devastating, since it limited educational access to only the
most basic curriculums, which meant that students so classified could at best attend
vocational high schools and would have a future without much chance at higher
education.171 The effects of this classification are still event in Israeli society today.172
During its rulings, the Israeli Supreme Court uncritically employed this pedagogical
label when considering Ashkenazi resistance to integration.173 The Israeli Supreme
Court's used this definition that applied primarily to the Mizrahis in an uncontextualized manner, that is without mentioning this definition’s original traits. This
usage of an inexplicit recognition of the group combined with the Israeli Supreme
Court's overlooking of the identity of the parties in these cases represents the way in
which the court inexplicitly acknowledged some existence of the group while at the
same time denying that group any legal relevance.
One might ask whether the Israeli Supreme Court's advancement of
integration is all that matters. This Article argues that it is not all that matters and that
by not mentioning Mizrahis and later blurring the role their poor social status played
in motivating the integration plan, the court declared that these facts had no meaning
in terms of creating legal recognition. As opposed to the American experience, where
courts narrated the suffering of segregated students, the narrative of Mizrahis’
segregation has been ignored, even though it was the motive behind the integration
plan. The transformation that the integration plan’s narrative has gone through in the
court has made the Mizarhis as a group be non-existent, and made the group have no
chance of becoming a legally recognized entity. But most importantly, the absence of
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the Mizrahi and Ashkenazi groups from the discrimination discourse has contributed
to the failure of the integration plan, which court appeared so eager to promote.174
One Israeli scholar argues that the court's failure to recognize the politics of
Israel's geography--that is, the residential segregation between Mizrahis and
Ashkenazis-- perpetuated segregated education "by requiring children to attend school
within the segregated district in which they reside."175 Under this argument, "more
attentiveness by Israeli courts and legislators to the unequal social division of space,
within which the reform was implemented" would have prevented this undesirable
outcome.176 But this analysis fails to recognize exactly the same things that the court
has failed to recognize. Considering the invisibility of the politics of space in the court
as the core of the problem ignores the politics of this invisibility itself. As this Article
demonstrated earlier, the ignoring of this politics of invisibility did not result from the
mere "inattentiveness" of the court, but rather represented fundamental conceptions
regarding the issue at hand. The court clearly was not unaware of the social identity of
the groups involved in the segregation dispute nor was unaware of the segregated
spaces in which these groups resided. The non-de jure discrimination against the
Mizrahis allowed the court to make these facts invisible, by ascribing to them no legal
relevance. This irrelevance does not necessarily result from the court's misconceptions
about space, but rather result from the lack of a Mizrahi group entity or the presence
of a Mizrahi group narrative in the legal system. This means that any attempt to
correct the court’s misconceptions about space would first require a correction of its
misconceptions about the groups. The thought that it is the nonexistence of the
Mizrahis group in the legal narrative that causes the court's shortcomings rather than
an ignorance of the politics of space is supported by the fact that the politics of space
do play a large role in analysis of discrimination against the Arab-Bedouin
population, demonstrating that in cases where the narrative recognizes a group that
the court is well aware of the impact of space.177 The court's consideration of the
Mizrahis, then must result not from inattentiveness to space, but rather must be the
result of choice by the court to legally ignore the Mizrahis group. Overt de jure
segregation of Mizrahis would have forced the court to cross these conceptual barriers
174
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about the Mizrahis group identity and would have made it impossible for the court to
ignore the existence of this group.
Today, some signs of re-contextualization in the Israeli education system are
becoming evident. Recent education legislation has focused on one’s origin as a
category that education system oppresses.178 Moreover, a recent ministerial committee
who reevaluated the Israeli education system explicitly used the ethnicity of the
Mizrahis in its recommendation for reforms. These changes might represent the
beginnings of the legal formulation of a Mizrahi group entity and lead to enhanced
equality in education.

3) Segregation and De-segregation of Arab-Palestinians: Relative Presence
A comprehensive analysis of de jure segregation in education in Israel would
require an analysis of the position of Arab-Israelis. But, due to irreconcilable cultural
and intellectual differences in educational aspirations between Arabs and Jews, in
most cases these two groups have been totally segregated and no case has been filed
challenging that segregation. However, the Israeli Supreme Court recent heard a case
on segregation between Arab-Israelis and Jewish-Israelis in the context of residential
segregation. In Ka'adan v. Israel Land Administration, the court held that a
segregating residential practice was illegally discriminatory. In this case, there was no
doubt about the identity of the groups involved or their power relations. At the
beginning of its opinion, the court explicitly frames the case as one in which an Arab
is barred from building a home in a Jewish settlement. The petitioners, an Arab-Israeli
couple, are presented as Arabs seeking to live among Jews.179 This case demonstrates
the easy recognition the court gives to the Arab group in the legal discourse on
antidiscrimination.
As opposed to the Arab’s experience, the Mizrahis’ attempts to overcome
discriminatory treatment were advanced through social struggles alone. However, as
the case of Mexican-Americans shows, the absence of legal recognition for a
discriminated group cannot be overcome by activist legal work. And as the integration
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in education litigation suggested, the antidiscrimination discourse was unavailable for
Mizrahis.
A demonstration of this point is the only attempt to gain legal recognition for
the Mizrahi group, which the Israeli courts bluntly rejected. In a case called
Hakeshet,180 the court dealt with a challenge that Mizrahis raised to the allocation of
lands in Israel among its Jewish population. Israel’s Lands Administration, the legal
body responsible for formulating land policy in Israel, decided to allocate extremely
valuable state lands to private citizens by changing its designation from agrarian to
urban. The allocation would have provided enormous compensation to the agrarian
sector, which was predominately of Ashkenazi population that used these lands.181
However, these lands were mostly state lands leased to the agrarian sector without
ownership rights, meaning that the agrarian sector was about to unjustly benefit from
the reallocation of this public property. In this case, the court again used various decontextualizing techniques. When introducing the case, the court described the
petitioners, a Mizrahi association. The court narrowly circumscribe the group by
defining it as an association striving to:182 "fight for the implementation of political,
cultural social and economic individual rights of all the citizens of Israeli society…
insisting on just and encompassing wealth distribution to all social groups in Israel."
The ellipses in the court's opinion elide the association's more contextualized and
sharp self-description, which stated that "[t]he association was initiated by women
and men, second and third generation offspring of Jews of Arab origin."183 Moreover,
throughout the brief the petitioners relied on an explicit narrative telling of the
systematic oppression of the Mizrahis. The court, though, chose to narrate the petition
being an administrative claim to avoid deciding the case based on the group's
oppression. The discrimination argument was also problematically shaped by the
Mizrahi petitioners themselves as one about the distinction between the "agrarian
sector" and the "urban sector", a distinction that risked again making this case racially
neutral by de-contextualizing the analysis. This shaping, though, resulted from the
lawyers' decision to refrain from using a "new entity" strategy due to the hazard of
180
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over-politicizing the suit or being denied legal relief for lacking standing.184 That is,
the activists were more concerned with achieving a concrete result by abolishing the
discrimination than concerned about striving for a general legal recognition of the
group as a whole.185 The court, upholding the petition, embraced the shape given by
the Mizrahi activists, yet erased, as was mentioned above, the identity of the
petitioners and again ignored the power relations between the groups involved in this
nationwide
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disproportionately benefited from this land allocation while the Mizrahi “urban
sector” had fewer opportunities to purchase from the state the public housing in which
they resided. The Israeli Supreme Court in this case clearly demonstrated its
unwillingness to recognize the Mizrahis as a discriminated-against group, even while
acknowledging the existence of the very discriminatory practices used against them.

4) Mexican-Americans and Mizrahis: The Shared Lines of Double Discrimination
Reflecting on the relationship between legal recognition and de jure
discrimination, a simple proposition might be that an explanation for the higher levels
of recognition given to de jure discriminated-against groups is the supposition that
these groups suffered more. This might be true, but as a theoretical matter the nature
of the suffering--be it de jure or de facto--should have no bearing on whether a group
is recognized as a group and is entitled to de jure antidiscrimination remedies in its
favor.
Whatever the motives behind the non-de jure discrimination of the MexicanAmericans186 and the Mizrahis187 groups are, the outcome of that discrimination was
184
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Mizrahis as an object, rendered official discrimination superfluous, as opposed to the case of
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legally untraceable discrimination. The existence of this form of legally untraceable
discrimination further disadvantaged these groups vis-à-vis de jure discriminatedagainst groups during the remedial stage. Both Mizrahis and Mexican-Americans
were subjugated by a hegemony that was not too “different” from them, compared
with the other de jure discriminated-against groups, thus making it complicated for
the law to differentiate these groups from their hegemonic counterpart. The legal
system is inherently limited by the need for simplicity, clarity, and other practical
concerns when implementing de jure discrimination; therefore, groups that suffer de
jure discrimination are likely to have simplistic differences, such as those based on
race, gender, or religion, because the easier it is for the law to identify the group, the
easier it is for the law to discriminate against that group.188 Moreover, adopting highly
contextual group definitions might go against the hegemony’s interest in making clear
legal distinctions between itself and its "other" as a means of justifying the
discrimination against this "other".189 This inherent difficulty of applying de jure
discriminate against fairly similar groups led to a false belief by the legal system that
no discrimination occurred against these groups. Instead, although there was a formal
equality, these groups suffered from substanital de facto discrimination. This
arrangement caused the "non-clusion" of the de facto discriminated-against groups
when they were barred from participating in the eventual remedial stage.
Mexican-Americans and Mizrahis thus both cross into the rights discourse
from a unique position. The critique in this Article about the limits of the
discrimination discourse has focused primarily on its rhetorical adherence to the
difference-sameness dichotomy, which guaranteed legal and social inclusion and

Palestinians, homosexuals and women, against whom discrimination is founded in the legal system."
Dahan-Kalev, supra note 140, at 94. Another proposition might be that this non-de jure discrimination
has served to strengthen the Zionist project of an Israeli-Jewish unity compared with an Arab ultimate
"otherness", which will never really jeopardize the Israeli power-relations. In this respect, Mizrahis are
an actual and conceptual part of the Israeli-Jewish mass, and thus in a better position to change the
existing power-relation through a legal struggle. Consequently, they are less likely to enjoy a legal
recognition that entitles them to antidiscrimination relief.
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Moreover, the legal system denied attempts to complicate those categorizations, even when the
"new category" contained an intersection of two former familiar bases, such as race and gender. See
Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in The Politics
of Law – A Progressive Critique 195 (Ed: David Kairys, 1990) (criticizing the court's dismissal of a
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entitlement for equal rights only to "similar" people.190 This dichotomy relies on the
concept of unity, which prevents a discussion from developing about discrimination
that imposes different outcomes among sub-groups of supposedly “similar” people.191
Mexican-Americans and Mizrahis share an illusory "sameness" with the hegemony;
specifically, they share the fact that they are both different from the defined "other"
and they share the fact that neither is subject to de jure discrimination. The myth of
these commonalities between these de facto-discriminated against groups and the
hegemonies is so deeply rooted that it prevents them from being identified as a
distinct discriminated-again group that would have some legal relevance within the
rights discourse.192
Part V: Pleading and Proving Discrimination within the Streaming from De
facto to De jure Paradigm – A Call for Substance, Context, and Consciousness
This Article stresses a phenomenological analysis, thus it is beyond the
confines of the article to suggest a full elaboration of the different ways through
which the legal system should treat differently discriminated-against groups. Instead,
in this Part the Article briefly points to the general possibility of expanding the limits
of the rights discourse through contextualization so that the rights discourse can
include de facto discriminated-against groups in its remedial stage. In order to
accomplish this inclusion, the legal system needs to develop a mechanism for
pleading and proving discrimination within the streaming from de facto/de jure
paradigm that uses a contextualized and historsized approach to inquire into the
social-political background of the formation of a group as discriminated-against. law
and its rights discourse are highly de-contextualized and de-historicized by their
alleged objective and universal nature, and thus they lack the conceptual room to
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consider contextualized issues.193 But it is only by being read against a contextual
background that the absence of de facto discriminated-against racial groups from the
legal narrative be understood as signifying double discrimination rather than as
signifying no discrimination. The argument here suggests that the law should move
toward a contextual and flexible test when implementing the Equal Protection Clause.
Of course, however, there are many factors that go into framing the proper rule, and
this Article's focus is too narrow to discuss all of them, but nonetheless the arguments
laid out here do suggest at least some movement toward greater contextualization and
flexibility in applying antidiscrimination laws.
Contextualizing the discrimination discourse is compatible with the
transformation through which discrimination as a social construct has been going as it
moved in the last decades from first-generation discrimination to second-generation
discrimination.194 One prominent characteristic of this transformation is that
discrimination is typically no longer formal and blatant but rather is contextual and
relational. The disappearance of blatant and intentional, discrimination practices and
the emergence of more subtle ones represent this conceptual and structural shift in the
discrimination

discourse.

First-generation

discrimination

violated

clear

and

uncontroversial norms of fairness and formal equality. In contrast, second generation
discrimination frequently involves patterns of interaction among groups that over time
lead to the exclusion of non-dominant groups in a way that makes the discrimination
difficult to trace back to the intentional, discrete actions of particular actors.195 The
absence of systematic institutional reflection about these patterns of second generation
discrimination contributes to its cumulative discriminatory effect.196 This generational
distinction is helpful in analyzing the de jure/de facto distinction’s role in forming
legally

cognizable

discriminated-against

groups.

The

first

generation's

institutionalized, horizontal, and formal discrimination scheme is the de jure style of
discrimination, whereas the second generation is a more complex and contextual style
of discrimination, the de facto style of discrimination. But although de facto
discriminated groups suffer from second generation discrimination style, they may
suffer from it within a system that is also engaged in first generation discrimination.
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The experience of these de facto discriminated-against groups challenges the onedimensional perception of discrimination. These groups are legal non-entities that
signify the existence of sophisticated discrimination forms within what firstgeneration discrimination. Indeed, one role de jure discrimination plays is to hide the
existence of co-existing de facto discrimination, and antidiscrimination laws should
keep this role in mind.
In this respect, this Article joins other calls to employ a critical approach to
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.197 With de facto discriminated-against groups,
courts must adopt alternative, less formal ways of proving discrimination. An
example of this approach is Supreme Court’s decision in Castaneda v. Partida, where
the Court applied a substantive test to gauge discrimination. The Mexican-American
petitioner alleged a violation of the equal protection clause in a Texas jury selection.
Ruling in the Mexican-American's favor, Court relied on statistical evidences on the
low percentage of Mexican-American jurors, concluding that this low percentage
could only be explained by intent to discriminate. Although it has not waived the
intentional discrimination prerequisite for asserting equal protection claims, the Court
has relaxed the traditional practice that proving intent requires a demonstration of de
jure discrimination.198 Later in this case, the Court also affirmed the status of
Mexican-Americans as an identifiable group and on that basis upheld the petitioner's
constitutional claim.
A critical test seeking to provide substantial protection against discrimination
would need to be aware of and concerned with the formal-substantive discrimination
distinction. The unique situation of de facto discriminated-against groups compels the
application of a more flexible, contextualized and historicized tests to deal with their
discrimination claims. Courts should be more suspicious of the harm that de facto
discriminated-against groups have suffered. In the case of Mexican Americans, courts
should not require petitioners to prove each time that they are a discriminated-against
group, and courts should also not limit their rulings to the specific circumstances of
each case. In the case of Mizrahis, the Israeli Supreme Court should “name” the
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parties before it when hearing discrimination cases and acknowledge their contextual
existence as discriminated-against groups
Conclusion
Nothing in this Article should be read as favoring discrimination; instead, the
goal of this Article is to take a more holistic approach to discrimination and how
different forms of discrimination affect the legal recognition of different groups.
Being a legally cognizable group might indeed prove insufficient for preventing racial
discrimination,199 but nevertheless this Article argues that the law is capable of
improving the overall well being of a group. De facto discriminated-against groups
have not suffered the same wrongs that de jure discriminated-against groups have
suffered; nevertheless, a group's status as being de facto discriminated-against is very
important for determining a group's position. This importance is particularly salient in
the remedial stage, since the entitlement to legal relief is affected by the existence of
de jure discrimination and groups that suffer primarily from de facto discrimination
are unable to take advantage of these remedial mechanisms. This Article has tried to
illuminate the phenomenology through which these groups have generated their
identities and have followed different paths in the remedial legal system based on the
different forms of discrimination they suffered.
In determining the scope of the eligibility of a de facto discriminated group for
antidiscrimination relief, courts should keep in mind the fact that the position of de
facto discriminated-against groups is a case study on the foolishness of believing that
what we see in the law is all that exists.
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